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FREEING THE AIRWAVES
Shreyas Jayasimha*
ShuvaMandal*
INTRODUCTION
Broadcasting, especially television, has over the years become a very competitive activity the world over. Satellites have not only increased the reach of television
channels manifold, but have made this possible at a considerably lower cost as
compared to that required for setting up a comparable terrestrial transmission
network. The ease with which signals from satellites are able to cross national
boundaries coupled with the attraction offered by a vast variety of programming
available therefrom has converted the world into a single television market.
The Indian Government has justified monopoly in broadcasting under the
pretext that otherwise it may be used for purposes not permitted by law. However,
with the advent of the 'Info-Age', the barriers on private broadcasting have begun
to crumble, especially in light of broadcasting being recognised as a free speech right
implicit in the Indian Constitution. The present article delves into the rights at stake
and prepares a framework to regulate the broadcasting media, so as to ensure that
its virtues do not become its enemies.
BROADCASTING

FREEDOM

AND ITS LIMITATIONS

Broadcasting is a means of communication and therefore a medium of speech
and expression. The fundamental right to speech and expression includes the right
to acquire and disseminate information, which involves the use of any media - print,
audiovisual or electronic.!
This right has two facets, the right to inform and educate and the right to be
informed and educated.2 The former is the broadcasters' right while the latter is the
viewers' right.
Viewers' rights include the right to imposition of programme codes, right to
be informed, right to multiplicity of opinion, right to balanced broadcast. 3 Broadcasters' rights include the right to frame own programme schedules, right to inform
and educate.

*

II Year, B.A., LL.B. (Hons.), National Law School of India University.

Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting v. Cricket Association of Bengal, AIR 1995
SC 1236 at para II. (Hereinafter

referred to as the c.A.B. case).

2

Indian Express Newspapers (Bombay) Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1986 SC 515.

3

It involves two affirmative responsibilities as laid down by the 'fairness doctrine' - (a) coverage
of issues of public importance,

and (b) presentation

of the 'opposing

view'.
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The United States Supreme Court has held that the viewers' right is paramount.4 This view has also been endorsed by the Indian Supreme Court in the C.A.B.
case.s In Odyssey Communications Pvt. Ltd. v. Lokvidyan Sanghatan,6 the Supreme
Court has ruled that there exists a fundamental right under Art. 19(1)(a) to exhibit
films on Doordarshan, subject to its terms and conditions, which can only be
curtailed under circumstances set out in Art. 19(2).
The scope of free speech in broadcasting has been expounded by the European
Court of Human Rights whereby, clause (1) of Art. 10 of the European Convention
of Human Rights has been said to include imparting information and ideas without
interference by public authorities and regardless of frontier.7
In Britain, there are no constitutional rights for either broadcaster or viewer.
There is no right to view a particular programme or to limit directly the programming
freedom of broadcasters.s In Italy, it is the duty of public broadcasting company to
provide comprehensive and objective news and information which was safeguarded
by Parliamentary Committee rather than by recognition of individual viewer rights.
Broadcasters' programming freedom when exercised with constraints imposed by
the regulatory authority has priority over the rights claimed by viewers to see a
particular programme.9 The German Basic Law is one of its kind in guaranteeing
reporting by means of broadcast free from censorship. Broadcasting freedom has a
constitutional value, requiring positive provisions by the legislature.10
Broadcasting cannot be made effective unless it involves the use of airwaves
and frequencies. Airwaves are public property and necessarily limited in their
nature. Since the electronic media involves the use of airwaves, this creates an inbuilt
restriction on the use as in the case of any other public property. Hence the right to
broadcasting as implied in Art. 19(1)(a) has certain inherent limitations as imposed
by nature, in addition to those contained in Art. 19(2).
Airwaves as public property must be used to subserve the common good. Being
public property, airwaves come within the ambit of Art. 39(b) and hence both
ownership and control of the material resource must be best achieved. It is the
multiplicity of views and the plurality of opinions that will create an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas, in consonance with the values of free speech that will counter

4
5

Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
AIR 1995 SC 1236.

6

AIR 1968 SC 1642.

7

Informations Verein

8
9

E.M. Barendt. Broadcasting Law - A Comparative Study 48 (1993).
Ibid., 49.

v.

v.

Federal Communications Commission, (1969) 395 US 367.

Austria, (1994) 17 EHRR 93.

10 Article 5 - "Everyone shall have the same right freely to express and disseminate his opinion by
speech, writing, and pictures and freely to inform himself from generally accessible sources.
Freedom of press and freedom of speech by means of broadcasting and films are guaranteed. There
shall be no censorship."
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any monopolization of the market, whether by the Government or by a private
licensee. The right to access to airwaves and frequencies can be claimed as part of
Art. 19(1)(a) by any Indian citizen.ll Access to airwaves needs to be supervised by
an autonomous authority representative of all sections of society. The Courts have
ruled that the need for such a representative authority is part of the viewers' rights
under Arts. 19(1)(a).12
A CASE AGAINST

STATE MONOPOLY

Broadcasting by airwaves certainly comes within the definition of 'telegraph'
as defined by the Indian Telegraph Act, 1885.13 S. 4(1) of the Act vests with the
Central Government the exclusive power to establish, maintain, and work telegraphs
within the territory of India. The proviso states that the Central Government may
grant licenses on such terms and conditions and in consideration of such payments
as it thinks fit to any person, to establish, maintain or work a telegraph within the
territory of India.
In the CAB. decision,14 the Court has asserted that broadcasting is implicit
within Art. 19(1)(a). In doing so, the freedom of broadcasting, like freedom of press
has been given a constitutional protection. As a result, the power of the government
to issue licences has to be justified within the provisions of Art. 19(2) alone. This
is because Art. 19(2) can.be the only restriction to a right recognised under Art.
19(1)(a).15 Moreover the phrase 'on consideration of such payments as it thinks fit'
must meet the requirements of reasonableness, as set out by Art. 14. Further, the
Constitution permits a State monopoly only in clause (6) of Art. 19 vis-a-vis a right
guaranteed by 19(1)(g). A monopoly over broadcasting whether by the Government
or anybody else, is inconsis~nt with the right of free speech. No monopoly of this
media can be tolerated for the simple reason that Art. 19(2) does not make a mention
of monopoly as a valid grounds of restricting Art. 19(1)(a), within which the right
to broadcast lies.
In Sakal Newspapers (P) L!d. v. Union of India, 16the Court held that the State
could not make a law which directly restricted one guaranteed freedom for securing
the better enjoyment of another freedom. Freedom of speech could not be restricted
for the purposes of regulating the commercial aspect of the activities of a newspaperP Even when imposing statutory orregulatory limitations under Art. 19(6), one

11 Per P.B. Sawant and S. Mohan, JJ. in the C.A.B. case, AIR 1995 se 1235 at 1305.
12 [d.
13 See, s. 3(1), Indian Telegraph Act, 1885.
14 AIR 1995 se 1236.
15 [d.

16 AIR 1962 SC 305.
17 S. Rangarajan v. P. Jagjivan Ram, (1989) 2

see

574.
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cannot impose restrictions which, even though reasonable, might in any way infringe
Art. 19(1)(a) in any manner not provided in Art. 19(2). For one cannot do indirectly
what one cannot do directly.
Gir Prasad v. Irrigation Department (Government of U.P.)18 has entirely
shifted the balance in favour of dismantling the State monopoly. The judgment
distinguishes between sovereign and non-sovereign functions of State action. Broadcasting is a non-sovereign function. The Commission ruled that as far as non-sovereign
functions are concerned, any Government department rendering services shall come
within the meaning of 'services' as defined in the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade
Practices Act, 1961.19 Thus with this wide definition, the present setup of broadcasting will attract the provisions of the Act, especially those relating to unfair and
monopolistic trade practices.
RIGHT

TO ESTABLISH

The
19(1)(a),
followed
station is
achieved

A PRIVATE

BROADCASTING

STATION

right to operate a private broadcast station does not flow from Art.
such a right is implicit in it.2o The Supreme Court in this respect has
the decision in the European Court where setting up of private television
not a matter of right emanating from free speech right rather a goal to be
only by Parliamentary policy.

Way back in 1983, the Delhi High Court in P.L. Lakhanpal v. Union of India21
had stated that denial of license to private individuals to establish broadcasting
station does not infringe upon his freedom of speech and expression. The right to
freedom of speech and expression and further effective communication is guaranteed only by the means that are available. The Government does not have the
responsibility to make available means of communication which each individual
considers appropriate. Thus, at present, individuals can exhibit films or programmes
on Doordarshan on a constitutional right subject to Doordarshan programme specifications.22
In the CA.B. decision, the Court averred that there is no distinction in principle
between a permanent, temporary, stationary or mobile station. It was said that the
right claimed by C.A.B. (the uplinking facility being provided to TWI) is no
different from right to establish and operate a private TV station. By granting C.A.B.
the claimed right to do so, the Court has very discreetly and implicitly recognised
the right to establish a private broadcast station. However, the opponents of private
broadcasting claim that unskilled use will lead to violation of frequency allotments.
Hence they argue that public order demands the regulation of the system.
18 MRTPC decision dated 1 July, 1996.
19 See, s. 2(r) of Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 196\.

20 CAB. case, AIR 1995 SC 1236.
21 AIR 1982 Delhi 167.
22 L./.C. v. Manubhni D. Slwh, AIR 1993 SC 171.
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A NEW STRUCTURE
Technical developments, in particular the foundation of cable networks and the
arrival of satellite television, are driving a rethinking of media policy. Suchentrepreneurship should be encouraged based on fIrm economic reasons. Advertising agents are lobbying for liberalisation of air waves - fIrst to establish the
legitimacy of private broadcasting (as an alternative for advertisements), and
secondly to relax programme constraints.23 This debate is all the more relevant in
present-day India. It may be noted that though citizens of India can produce any
programme of their choice, they are not permitted to broadcast them on their own.
Also, public broadcasting alone cannot cater to the demands of the innumerable
viewers in India. As a result, several home-grown channels are spending precious
foreign exchange on leasing transponders and other broadcast facilities outside the
country.
Generally public and private broadcasters are perceived as competitors, albeit
in a regulated market. However, there is another perspective which sees their roles
as essentially complementary.24 A situation is envisaged where the State channels
can coexist with private channels under the supervision of an independent public
broadcasting authority. Such an authority's jurisdiction and powers must be far wider
than those envisaged in the Prasar Bharati (Broadcasting Corporation of India) Act,
1990.25 The nature of the functions may be divided into two main categories:

A. Licensing:
The licensing process involves linked substantive and procedural issues. On
what grounds are licences awarded and how much, if any, discretion does the
licensing authority enjoy? How open are the procedures by which applications
are considered and the fInal decisions taken? One of the major considerations
should be a minimum 'qualifying revenue', that is, the revenue derived from
advertising, sponsorship, and subscription. Another criterion could be the
'sustainability test', that is to ask, whether or not the applicant would be able
to maintain the service throughout the period for which the license would be
in force.26 It is also imperative that the license be conditional on certain
fairness rules and be limited in time, as in Lebanon.27 In distributing licences,
the independence of the authority must be stressed so as to eliminate all
interferences whatsoever.28

23

M.S. Fowler and D.L. Brenner, A Marketplace Approach to Broadcasting Regulations, 60 Texas
L.Rey. 207 (1980)

24

See, Korean Broadcasting

25

See, s. 12, Prasar Bharati (Broadcasting

Corporation

26

See, ss. 15 and 16, British Broadcasting

Act, 1990.

27

See, Lebanese

28

Applying

Bill, 1996.

Audioyisuallnformation

the test of 'reasonableness'

of India) Act, 1990.

Law, 1994.
as read into Art. 14 of The Constitution

of India.

Vol. 9]

Freeing the Airwaves

155

B. Regulation:
The present Prasar Bharati (Broadcasting Corporation of India) Act, 1990
merely gives advisory powers while adjudicating matters.29 In an atmosphere
where private broadcasting is allowed, greater powers will have to be given
such as equating the council with any civil court in the land, as in the case of
the Press Council of India. 30 Appeals must be allowed from this body to higher
courts in the land. Another way of regulating private broadcasters would be to
withdraw or deny renewal of licences to private broadcasters for violations of
regulations. Such powers may also be exercised so as to prevent or monitor
foreign participation in this seCtor.
The need for an independent authority has never been more imperative in India.
We must examine successful structures elsewhere and incorporate salient features.
In Britain, there exists the Office of Telecommunications (OFTEL), which is a nonministerial government department, headed by a director-general who is free from
ministerial control but accountable to Parliament.31 Such a structure is admirable as
it ensures independence in decision making. Apart from the nature of appointment,
financial autonomy is a prerequisite for the smooth operation of a regulatory
mechanism. The Press Council of India is one.such body which has a separate fund
for itself.32 The new Broadcasting authority which is envisaged should also have a
similar arrangement.
Considering the professed federalist structure in India, it is pertinent to
examine federalist influences on Media policy. The recent Latvian enactment creates
Statutory State Telecommunications Inspectorates, along with the National Broadcast Council, where the State Inspectorates share the veto power with the National
Council on matters relating to local broadcasting.33 Compare this with the total
discretion that the Prasar Bharati Act gives to the Broadcasting Corporation of India
to establish State bodies as it wishes, merely to facilitate its own functioning.34
Last, but not least, effective anti-trust and cross-media ownership regulations
must be in place before permitting private broadcasting. The Italian Constitutional
Court refused to permit private broadcasting (beyond the local level) until adequate
anti-trust legislation had been introduced.35 The Federal Communication Commission is responsible for regulating all inter-state and foreign communication by means
of radio, television, wire, cable and satellite. In the US, the Federal Communication

29 See, s. 15(4) of Prasar Bharati Act, 1990.
30 See, s. 15, Press Council ACt, 1978.
31 Sanjit Singh, A Case for Duopoly, The Economic Times (Bangalore), Nov. 4, 1996.
32 See, s. 18, Press Council Act, 1978.
33 See, ss. 8 & 9 of the Latvian Mass Media Act, 1996.
34 See s. 14(4), British Broadcasting Act, 1990.
35 See, Decision 148/1981 [1981] Guir.cost. 1379 and Decision 826/1988 [1988] Guir.cost. 3893.
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Commission Rules bar common ownership of a daily newspaper, radio, or television
station in the same market. At the same time, common ownership of a television
station and a cable system in the same market is prohibited. Two types of formations
have to be guarded against - vertical integration (between broadcasters and advertisers) and horizontal integration (between competing broadcasters). Also, the
phenomenon of multimedia integration has to be combated. However, constitutionally speaking, there are two questions to be asked 1.

Are the rules permissible under Art. 19(2)?

2.

Are the rules required to promote and further freedom of information?

CONCLUSION
With the integration of media technologies and blurring of traditional boundaries separating telephone, radio, television, cable, satellite and video industries in
the context of emerging scenario of Information Age, the laws governing such
concerns need an immediate overhauling. In 1993, the U.S. Congress passed laws
that asked the Federal Communication Commission to organize 'efficient and
intensive use of electromagnetic spectrum'. This triggered the auctioning of airwaves
which has accumulated pickings of $10 billion.36 With airwaves being declared
public property by the Supreme Court and the Government auctioning public utilities
like telecommunications, nothing really stops the authorities from liberalising the
airwaves.
That liberalisation of the airwaves will create a 'market place of ideas'. This
is amply demonstrated by the Japanese experience, where concentration of media
ownership is growing, although it has manifested itself not in mergers and acquisition typical of other industrialized countries, but more in the expansion of well
established public groups into other media sectors.37
India has been muddling in the area of broadcasting laws. Several Commissions
have been appointed and the Prasar Bharati Act is yet to be brought into force,38 and
not without good reason.39 By enacting the appropriate law and encompassing
private broadcasters within the purview of such law, much of the undesirable laissezfaire that exists can be curbed. Framing a Broadcasting law might pose many
challenges, but Parliament can no longer wish away their responsibility by further
procrastination. The future is at our doorstep, it is time we face it.

36 Abheek Barman, How to Sell Air Efficiently, The Economic Times (Bangalore), Dec. 27, 1996.
37 Sub-Committee of the Consultative Committee of the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting,

National Media Policy - A Working Paper 21 (March 1996).
38 S. 3(1) of the Prasar Bharati Act (1990).
39 The Chanda Committee Report of 1966 on whose recommendation All India Radio was made
autonomous; Verghese Committee Report, 1977 which was the basis for the Prasar Bharati Act
(1990) and Ram Vilas Paswan Committee Report on a National Media Policy merely illustrate the
dithering attitude of the Government as regards Broadcasting law.

